To sustain itself as the world's premier land power, the U.S. Army needs the capability to support expeditionary forces by projecting a minimal basing footprint with reduced logistical burdens. Strategically sited contingency bases (CBs) allow the Army's expeditionary forces to rapidly respond throughout a joint area of operations. To assist with this goal, the Army is funding work in the Engineer Site Identification for the Tactical Environment (ENSITE) program, which is dedicated to empowering military planners with the data and knowledge to site CB locations. The work reported here explores reasonable analytical framings for the site suitability analysis, including identification of appropriate methods, criteria, and parameters for evaluating different spatial areas for suitability as new CBs. This work utilizes the specialized capabilities and knowledge of the U.S. Army Engineer, Research, and Development Center's Risk and Decision Science Team (RADS), who worked with ENSITE colleagues and subject matter experts to identify key factors relevant for locating CBs.
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Objectives
During fiscal year (FY)16 and FY17, the RADS team worked with ENSITE colleagues and subject matter experts to identify key factors relevant for locating engineering sites. The team's objectives were to provide the ENSITE team with the following: (1) summary of U.S. Army personnel's knowledge in base camp siting, (2) analysis of current U.S. Army policy and publications for base camp siting, (3) development of a preliminary set of spatial criteria (i.e., factors that influence CB siting), and (4) development of a preliminary framework set of design choices (i.e., factors that will influence how base siting criteria are interpreted under different scenarios).
Approach
The authors reviewed literature and media sources that highlighted historical examples where base camps failed. They then interviewed over a dozen current and former Army officers with active-duty CB siting experience to better understand the Army's historical considerations for base camp selection in the field. They also reviewed relevant military protocols for additional background, context, and evidence or verification of historical base camp selection methodologies.
After initial review, a list of the most common criteria was developed from the conversations and information in publicly available documents. Criteria were sorted into a hierarchical framework based on commonly used military mission-related acronyms including METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civilian considerations), ASCOPE (area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events), and OAKOC (observations and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment). The function of the decision tree developed for this work is to evaluate total site suitability across a holistic set of tactical considerations.
Methods for Developing a Decision Framework

Historical examples
There are important lessons to learn from failed base camps, particularly when their failure is related to site-specific conditions. The historical examples that we examined include five base camps in Afghanistan, one base camp in Iraq, one base camp in South Korea, one base camp in Kosovo, and one air base in Uzbekistan. Appendix A gives a synopsis of each camp, and then highlights specific criteria in which inadequate consideration may have led to the unanticipated and negative outcomes. These examples and their details come primarily from talking with personnel who had direct or indirect knowledge of these events.
Officers interviewed
The RADS team consulted with fourteen U.S. Army officers who had firsthand experience living on and/or constructing base camps. These conversations (informal interviews) provided insight and understanding of current base camp operations and the criteria relevant to base camp siting. The conversations were conducted orally, in-person, or over the phone. 
Documents reviewed
The RADS team reviewed a variety of military documents to gain an understanding of base camps operations and doctrine relevant to their construction and safety. The following documents proved most helpful for providing additional background and context, and many of these are cited within the text of this report (see reference list for full publication details):
• 
Decision Criteria Framework
Design templates
There are several design choices that must be identified initially that will shape the criteria required for the decision support tool. Decisions at this stage will inform the tool's architecture through selection of relevant criteria and value functions. For example, if ground resupply is necessary, road networks are a required criterion to connect the base camp to its main supplier, but road networks may not be needed as a criterion in some other situations Therefore, making a design choice to consider ground resupply is necessary before including and evaluating the importance of the road transportation criteria. For example, if selected, a design with more roadways connecting the base camp to its main supplier may be preferred to a "one road in, one road out" situation. Proposed design choice factors are shown in Table 1 . To illustrate this concept, suppose a battlespace commander may site a combat outpost (COP) in a remote location of Afghanistan by selecting the design choice factors circled in Table 2 . Figure 4 , shown at the end of this subsection.
Intervisibility lines/dead space
Intervisibility lines are a relative, localized, pattern of limitations on observation, caused by variations in terrain elevation.
Vantage points
Locate away from potential enemy vantage points. The following are two examples of potential enemy advantages: (1) higher surrounding terrain or buildings provide direct line of sight for the enemy, and (2) vegetation, drainage channels, ditches, ridges, or culverts can provide enemy concealment. Locate close to potential CB vantage points. For example, high points reduce the effectiveness of an attack and force aggressors to fire up toward the target (Hyperion 2014).
Roads and highways
Identify road requirements that could impact security (e.g., how closely located a base is to a public throughway). Be aware of uncontrolled vehicle access, while considering the tradeoff of minimizing access roads compared to a potentially dangerous one-road-in/one-road-out scenario.
Landing Zone (LZ)
The ability to provide enduring support via air requires space for a landing zone or airfield. TSLOW considerations mean the following: terrain, slope, landing zone, obstacles, wind.
Decisive features
Key locations such as terrain or structures (natural or man-made) that will give a marked advantage to whomever controls it (e.g., a bridge).
Landslides
Natural hazard which can strike instantaneously and result in troop deaths.
Sandstorms and dust
Sandstorms may severely limit the lifespan of electronic and computer equipment and inhibit observation of the enemy.
Hydrology
Avoid floodplains or other locations that can be inundated by seasonal hydrological changes (e.g., intermittent rivers or flash floods).
Soil
Certain soil types are more advantageous for construction, trafficability, and waste management options.
Aquifer access
Suitability of wells depends on the depth required to reach the water.
CBRN hazards
Soldiers may be exposed to a range of CBRN hazards that carry potential health risks (Corson and Jaspero 2007; ATP 5-19) .
Natural and existing barriers
Features used for protective measures (e.g., mountains, rivers, bays, cliffs). Also, the use of trees, fences, land forms, or buildings can obscure sight paths and impede an enemy attack, providing defense of depth.
Vegetation (relating to Obstacles)
Vegetation may provide an ideal deterrent or natural barrier (e.g., swamps, thick forests) (Hyperion 2014). (6) what events will significantly affect organizations, people, or military operations, and when will they occur. These criteria are explained in the subsections below and highlighted on the decision tree in Figure 7 at the end of this subsection.
Construction materials
Sources of natural construction resources (e.g., water, gravel, and fill materials).
Boundaries
Political, ethnic, or tribal boundaries and locations of government centers.
Religious and historical sites
Respecting sacred sites helps build rapport with the host nation.
Local infrastructure
Availability of existing structures and local facilities and infrastructure that can help sustain base camps, as outlined below:
• Traditional high-payoff targets such as bridges, communication towers, power plants, and dams. • International and locally significant sites that include the following: churches, mosques, national libraries, hospitals, cemeteries, historical ruins, religious sites, cultural areas, and other protected sites.
• Practical sites that may influence operations such as jails, warehouses, toxic industrial storage sites, print plants, and television and radio stations.
Local economy
Ability of local economies and local businesses and laborers to support base camps, with services as listed and annotated below.
• Sewer: local government (mayor and council) 
Local groups
Organizations within and outside the AOI that can support or affect base camps, including local labor unions, criminal organizations, community watch groups, and governmental or nongovernmental agencies and organizations.
Land ownership
In many places, property ownership standards differ from U.S. standards, causing execution problems with land titles, including the risk of duplicate or erroneous payments.
Dislocated civilians
Effects of indigenous and transient civilians on base camps.
Local activities
Routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that can affect base camps (e.g., holidays, elections, celebrations, demonstrations). ERDC 3.3 ENSITE scoring of criteria for site suitability
When run, the ENSITE tool scores regions for base camp siting suitability. A mock-up of this interface depicting the scores of different gridded regions is shown in Figure 8 . Scoring is displayed on a red/yellow/green scale, with red being the least suitable and green being the most suitable site for a base camp. 
Discussion
Significant effort in FY16-FY17 was made to explore reasonable analytical framings for the site suitability analysis, including identification of appropriate methods, criteria, and parameters for evaluating different spatial areas for suitability as new CBs. The RADS team worked with ENSITE colleagues focused on tool development to transition this knowledge and its context and rationale so that it can influence how these models and assessments are being developed.
The RADS team explored the types of criteria and design choices that can influence CB siting in general, but it did not explore the ranges or specific values those criteria could and should take in different military mission phases. The team engaged with subject matter experts to begin to answer these more specific questions and to refine the decision analytic framework. The team refined the most important subset of ten criteria and determined the appropriate weighting schemes for a generalized combat mission.
Furthermore, the RADS team and other ENSITE team member efforts to date have focused primarily on developing frameworks and models to support CB-siting decisions. These products have not yet been demonstrated in a fully detailed and realistic example. Future efforts may include developing a hypothetical but realistic case scenario that can be used to demonstrate relevant aspects of the ENSITE framework and tools.
